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This paper re-examines the over-indebtedness of European consumers and the suitability of the policy and legal responses to address a problem that has major consequences for those who are affected, and which bears significant social and economic costs for the Union and its citizens.
The topic is not entirely new and the possible role of the EU has already been discussed in both policy and academic circles for over twenty years.​[1]​ However, little has been materially done so far at Union level, but in the wake of one of the severest recessions in the modern history of Europe the issue seems to have turned from urgency into emergency.
Traditionally, consumer financial difficulty and over-indebtedness have been associated with excessive consumer borrowing or credit provisioning by financial institutions. In general, macroeconomic theory suggests that credit supply is a variable that should be maintained at an optimal level as both under and over-provision disrupt the equilibrium of an economy and its agents. Household credit is no exception and an optimal level of credit provision may be beneficial for consumers in adjusting fluctuations of income, addressing short-term liquidity problems or temporary economic shocks, or accessing costly goods or services that would otherwise be unaffordable. It is a truism that too little household credit may hamper the economy, but too much credit not only feeds inflation but it also leads to busts that are responsible for financial crises such as the last one labelled as the Great Recession.​[2]​
At EU level the integration of consumer and mortgage credit markets has featured importantly for an efficient functioning of the EU financial system and its economy, as well as for the full achievement of the fundamental freedoms set by the EU Treaties and the establishment of the internal market. However, it is only in recent years that both the consumer and the mortgage credit markets have been receiving growing attention from policy makers, and EU legislation seeking harmonisation has been passed. The market for loans available to consumers has developed rapidly in the last couple of decades across the EU, and it has become increasingly accessible and sophisticated. The other side of the coin is that with the expansion of the retail and mortgage credit markets European consumers are becoming more and more indebted. At the same time, alongside consumer indebtedness the growth of financial difficulties or over-indebtedness is becoming an economic and a social cost raising concerns across Europe, in turn placing household debt levels high in the policy agendas of national and EU policy-makers alike.
Besides, the on-going financial crisis has raised important issues regarding the protection of consumers, the scope, intensity and effectiveness of regulation in financial markets, as well as the need for additional safeguards to stem the social problems that the crisis has exacerbated. Consumers are still bearing the costs of the failure of financial markets, as exemplified by policy documents pointing to the severe consequences for individual homeowners losing their homes in a foreclosure procedure, but also for society as a whole in consideration of their impact on financial and social stability.​[3]​
Moreover, with the austerity measures taken by, or imposed on, many Member States as a core strategy to overcome the wave of the economic crisis and the tackling of excessive public debt and budget deficits, non-performing personal and mortgage loans and job losses have increased indicating that household financial difficulties and debt levels are likely to persist, if not intensify.​[4]​
Therefore, alongside the advancement of harmonising measures for the cross-border provision of credit and the abolition of obstacles for further market integration, the promotion of responsible lending and borrowing has become prominent on the agenda of EU policy-makers as the core policy to accompany the creation of a single market for credit but limit the over-indebtedness of European consumers.
However, this policy and the ensuing legal responses require an assessment as to their appropriateness and effectiveness to tackle the individual, social and economic costs of the problem, which in turn demand a prior proper understanding of the notion itself of over-indebtedness alongside the closer scrutiny of the private law relationship between borrowers and financial institutions.




2.	Over-indebtedness, its causes, and the weakening link to financial credit

Over the years there have been several attempts to understand and define over-indebtedness.
Intuitively, the concept derives from that of debt, which is inevitably intertwined with that of credit. Credit and debt make reference to the private law relationship of one party (the creditor) advancing goods or services which will be repaid at a later stage by the other party (the debtor), with or without interests. This creation of long-lasting contractual relationships notoriously includes loans, i.e. the advancement of money to pay upfront for other goods or services, an activity usually done by credit institutions in the credit market, which may take the form of consumer or mortgage credit. The reference to the ‘consumer’ element indicates that the credit is provided to individuals for personal, domestic or household purposes, differentiating it from business credit.​[5]​
Cultural approaches or habits regarding the use of credit may vary considerably from one Member State to the other. Nevertheless, the liberalisation and expansion of credit markets, alongside the following increased availability of credit to feed the consumption model of the modern society may explain why, traditionally, consumer loans and excessive lending by financial institutions or borrowing by consumers have been associated with over-indebtedness. Market deregulation, coupled with an incomplete social safety net, are often recognised as structural conditions that lead to an environment hospitable to financial difficulty.​[6]​ 
But, if lending/borrowing certainly give rise to indebtedness, to what extent the latter turns into over-indebtedness and it is responsible for it is not straightforward and it remains doubtful.
This is because indebtedness per se is not a problem. On the contrary, from an economic viewpoint consumer borrowing is seen positively to adjust fluctuations of income, address short-term liquidity problems, and give the possibility of improving their lifestyle by smoothing consumption over their life time making accessible expensive goods such a property.
The problem arises when, irrespective of its causes, indebtedness turns into over-indebtedness. And this is also where the first conceptual difficulties emerge about the understanding of the precise moment when this passage occurs, as well as the meaning itself of over-indebtedness and the knowledge of it, all of which in turn have ensuing major policy and legal implications.
Understandingly so, therefore, over time a growing number of EU commissioned studies, academic literature, and just one policy document have obstinately attempted to define the exact and univocal terms or boundaries of the phenomenon.​[7]​ However, as such efforts have been the result of the observation of national situations characterised by structural or prolonged difficulties in repaying personal debts, a common operational definition or measurement at EU level to a large degree still does not exist. 
The major effort undertaken by the European Commission under the project ‘Towards a Common European Operational Definition of Over-Indebtedness’ has revealed that there is not a uniquely acknowledged definition and the concept varies across the Member States. Despite attempts to identify common elements, the study has unveiled that even if the measurement unit in most cases refers to the ‘household’ nonetheless in other cases the focus is on the ‘individual debtor’. Or the length of time of the financial difficulty, though present in most jurisdictions, is not universally accepted. Likewise, only half of the studied jurisdictions made a reference to the cost of living expenses. What perhaps is the most common element in the various jurisdictions is the indication of the payment incapacity to honour the contracted obligations, but without commonality of the type of commitment.​[8]​ Despite highlighting terminological and conceptual confusions, in its attempt to recognise common elements of over-indebtedness the study has captured a multi-dimensional nature of the problem. This includes an economic dimension of over-commitments, a time dimension over a long period which makes it structural, a social dimension leading to exclusion, and a psychological dimension of stress and health harm.​[9]​
The study may be a helpful resource in the understanding or recognition of the scope of the problem but its multi-dimensional notion proves difficult for a practical application, especially if it has to be translated into supranational law. In particular, it hardly helps the jurist, who necessarily needs to identify a sufficiently precise content and its borders to the extent that a legal framework aims to confer a status to the situation of over-indebtedness and identify the scope of application of its norms. As acknowledged by recent scholarship, the continuing vacuum of a clear content-based notion of over-indebtedness not only makes the comparison between Member States difficult​[10]​ but also a European response problematic.
On the other hand, however, the EU competence on the matter is arguably important to the effective operation of the single market to avoid the fragmentation between the various national jurisdictions when dealing with the effects generated by the same market. In addition, the promotion of competition between credit providers or other financial institutions under Articles 3 and 32 TFEU, as well as requirements of consumer protection under Article 12 and 169 TFEU, may demand that household over-indebtedness becomes framed in effective Union policy and law.​[11]​
A new perspective that could bring possible light for future concrete EU initiatives is represented by the latest European Commission study on the updated mapping of the situation, its nature and its causes.​[12]​ 
The study represents an important step forward in the knowledge of the actual social circumstances in which financial difficulty is embedded. It details the type of consumers who are more prone to be in financial distress, the causes and the consequences of debt problems, and the national measures in place to identify and alleviate the debt crisis. Using an expression of Micklitz, it may finally represent a step forward in giving to the phenomenon a sort of a “human face”.​[13]​
For the purpose of this work, the empirical investigation which has been conducted suggests that time may have come to abandon attempts to precisely define a term that the large majority of stakeholders at all levels seem to find unhelpful - from the industry to civil society organisations and from public authorities to independent experts. Instead, the starting point is that over-indebtedness in practice is about people, who are unable to pay debts and meet essential living expenses, and therefore find themselves in persistent difficult and traumatic situations. Thus, according to the report, the focus could be on identifying the key policy concerns that exist and from there developing reliable indicators to help tracking them. In so doing, over-indebtedness is deconstructed in the two dimensions: 

(a) the type of financial commitment, which in addition to financial borrowing includes all other household commitments including bills or rents; and 
(b) the nature of the matter, specified as the excessive level or inability to meet commitments when they fall due.​[14]​

The relevant indicators of the (a) type of commitment include measures of arrears on mortgages, consumer credit, rent, utility payments, the incapacity to face unexpected expenditures, and the inability to sustain basic living expenses.​[15]​
Seen from this angle, the approach becomes more grounded in the real social and financial circumstances of individuals, and it is more pragmatic. Over-indebtedness is about people, who have on-going difficulties with meeting their commitments of any nature, and not just in repaying their loans contracted with financial institutions. To some extent, this may have the potential for substantial policy implications in shifting away the full attention exclusively on borrowing from credit institutions. Equally, this also directs into the crucial relevance of the causes of over-indebtedness that are intertwined with the (b) nature of the problem, because they become key determinants for its assessment.
As surprising as it may be, the major causes for consumer over-indebtedness were already acknowledged in the literature,​[16]​ but they have been left unattended by policy-makers as if only excessive borrowing or lending were to be accountable. These causes are life-time events or macro-economic factors, such as illness, divorce, unemployment, declining wages, etc.​[17]​ The Commission report enriches the spectrum adding politically sensitive elements that were never accounted as ‘debt’ but that were obvious to any ordinary person. These causes include increased level of taxation (now more topical than ever in a number of Member States with austerity measures in place) and cuts in social welfare which require more household outgoings to provide for their cover, as well as basic utilities or daily essential expenditures and low standards of incomes vis-à-vis the cost of living.​[18]​ In a nutshell, all that is needed to make ends meet.
Not surprisingly, most of the above findings find confirmation in another new study on selected countries having in common the intervention of international bail-outs.​[19]​
The Commission study assumes a particular significance. For the first time, it establishes a clear, though non-exclusive, link between over-indebtedness and poverty or impoverishment in its double face: if it is true that over-indebtedness leads to deprivation and poverty, it is equally factual that low income or exposure to financial shocks of any nature is associated with over-indebtedness. It exposes what is intuitive, i.e. that most people have to pay for rent or mortgage, they need to attend essential living expenditures, they may have some levels of consumer loans which they could afford at the time of contracting, etc. As a consequence, some people may need to take further use of credit to make up for those repayments. But for those substantial in number people who are at the level of floatation a shock in their income or in their outgoings may take them from indebtedness to over-indebtedness. In essence, all those life-time or macro-economic events have a direct impact on all existing contract relations, some of which have been conceptualised by recent scholarship as ‘life-time contracts’ (or social long-term contracts).​[20]​ 
Of course there may be those who knowingly or unknowingly mismanage their financial affairs, but the scale of this problem seems limited and it has never really helped to understand the phenomenon. Yet, the problem of failure to repay loans to financial institutions exacerbates the financial situation of the debtor because of the spiralling of debt problems due to the impact of interests, compounded interests, penalties, fees, etc. up to the point when the situation becomes unmanageable or at a point of no return. Likewise, aggressive or irresponsible lending practices which clearly exist in the marketplace must not be condoned for being unfair and for making difficult or bad financial situations of consumers even worse. This clearly justifies in itself regulation tailored to tackle them. But, as established by previous research, these sort of lending practices are not the original or principal causes of financial difficulty and in statistical terms they affect only a small number of borrowers.​[21]​
In the end, the innovative approach taken by the latest reports towards over-indebtedness and their findings question the policies and legal responses adopted until now at EU level and it opens new routes and challenges to the European jurist.
At first sight, it appears clear that the type of financial commitments and the nature of the problems find their roots in a number of national soils which are beyond the remit or control of the EU legislator and which are far broader than the debt relationship – for example issues of political economy, taxation, salary levels and cost of living, etc. These are very sensitive national political issues and not much can be expected at the level of policies and law tailored on over-indebtedness, especially under EU law.
Nevertheless, there seem to be also something left for the EU and its future agenda on over-indebtedness. Until now the focus has been exclusively on the internal market and the empowerment of the reasonably circumspect consumer in the private law relationship between lenders and borrowers​[22]​, concentrating on the responsible behaviour of the contracting parties and prevention through creditworthiness assessment.




3.	The EU policy response: responsible lending and borrowing

For quite some time over-indebtedness has been perceived as a problem to be addressed by national legislators. By the late 1980s there were already a number of national initiatives introducing personal bankruptcy or debt counselling services to seek solutions to household debt problems. They represented the response to the consequences of the rapid increase in the volume and variety of credit services in some Member States, especially in northern Europe, reflecting a significant gap in the use and pattern of consumer borrowing across the then EC. This diversity started to narrow only following the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty from 1993 with the establishment of the single market and the opening-up of national credit markets.​[23]​ 
By then, also the EU policy-makers have started to show an interest in the theme as a spill-over of the common market. Reports commissioned by the European Commission and some literature have followed suits, recommending national actions and pointing towards the adoption of common principles for a European approach to the over-indebtedness of consumers. Such scholarship often directed towards debt restructuring or consumer insolvency regimes to capture common traits or trends towards possible convergence.​[24]​
However, in line with the efforts to achieve a single market in credit for consumers, the EU policy response to over-indebtedness has been in terms of preventively delivering a credit market that is ‘responsible’. The main objective of EU measures to achieve the common market point to the creation of a regime which encourages vigorous competition, innovation and choice within a trusty framework that rejects unfair and irresponsible practices. But the main drive remains the economic one of enabling consumers and businesses to take full advantage of the single market.​[25]​
So, despite over-indebtedness has long been recognised as a major problem affecting the common credit market, until now the EU has remained lethargic in this specific domain. EU policy measures or legal instruments that directly cover financial difficulty have remained scarce. The only handful documents that the EU has produced are a pre-financial crisis Council Recommendation​[26]​ and two Opinions of the Economic and Social Committee​[27]​ – all pointing to declarations of intent regarding the need of prevention, alleviation and rehabilitation with measures such as monitoring, financial education counselling, responsible credit practices, balanced debt enforcement measures, and the promotion of debt adjustment procedures. Leaving aside the non-binding nature of these instruments, Niemi meaningfully noticed that in reality the EU had no programmes in place relating to consumer over-indebtedness and the matter did not even appear in the Consumer Policy strategy 2007-2013.​[28]​ Equally, all what the new European Consumer Agenda does is a generic reference that “households’ over-indebtedness is also worrying” anticipating the above analysed European Commission study,​[29]​ yet problem-debt deserves no mention in the EU multiannual consumer programme for the years 2014-20.​[30]​
It is true that in the aftermath of the latest economic crisis the European Commission has stressed the importance for Member States of having “measures to prevent over-indebtedness and maintain access to financial services”​[31]​ (emphasis added to note that ‘cure’ finds no mention). But the declared goal is to deliver “responsible and reliable financial markets for the future” announcing that “to ensure that European investors, consumers and SMEs can be confident about their savings, access to credit and their rights as concerns financial products, the Commission will come forward with (…) measures on responsible lending and borrowing”​[32]​ (emphasis added).
From all the policy measures produced to date it appears evident how the creation of trust in the market is dominant and how to some extent the prevention of over-indebtedness – but not its cure - has remained hidden in the quest for the promotion of the internal market. In this way, over-indebtedness becomes incorporated in the rhetoric of ‘responsible lending and borrowing’ as an introduction of best market practices to be achieved by means of an indeterminate regulatory public intervention on the behaviour of the contracting parties of credit agreements.
But then again, ‘responsible lending and borrowing’ clearly pose problems of conceptual and legal definition.
Policy documents reveal that responsible lending makes reference to the delivery of responsible and reliable markets, where consumer confidence is restored and credit products are appropriate for consumers’ needs and tailored to their ability to repay their debts. It envisages a framework that could ensure that all lenders and intermediaries act in a fair, honest and professional manner before, during, and after the lending transaction. Similarly, for responsible borrowing it is expected that in order to obtain credit consumers provide relevant, complete and accurate information on their finances. They are also encouraged to make informed and sustainable borrowing decisions.​[33]​
A consultation conducted by the European Commission provides a more concrete illustration of this concept. It explicitly targets measures to adequately assess, by all appropriate means, borrowers’ creditworthiness before granting them a loan, thus attempting to tackle over-indebtedness. The consultation covered, among other things, the advertising and marketing of credit products, the information to be provided to borrowers prior to granting any loans, ways to assess product suitability and borrower creditworthiness, advice standards, responsible borrowing and issues relating to the framework for credit intermediaries (for example, disclosures, registration, licensing and supervision).​[34]​
Conceptually, it may not be straightforward why imposing such a duty on party autonomy for what already appears to be in their self-interest: prima facie, lenders have no self-interests in giving credit irresponsibly, i.e. lending money that will be unlikely repaid to them. Moreover, the economic literature has long explained that the credit industry is traditionally risk-averse.​[35]​ Likewise, with the exclusion of the disproportional fewer cases of fraud, it may be unclear why someone would borrow money knowing that s/he cannot repay them back with all the dear consequences that will follow from non-payment.
Yet, financial markets have demonstrated distortions in such basic principles. Recent experience has shown how lenders have devised instruments to pass on the risk of default to third parties, ultimately creating dangerous financial products, discouraging the former to act responsibly towards their original interest.​[36]​ Also, in a very competitive market the costs of properly assessing the risks of defaults through individualised controls, coupled with the pressure to gain market share and acquire new customers approving quickly credit applications, may encourage financial institutions to budget the losses of defaults in the cost of credit. Likewise, false economic assumptions of the ever rising value of collaterals such as property may induce lenders to exceed limits. Again, sale structures via intermediaries who earn their fees through commissions incentivise the latter to conclude as many credit agreements as they can.​[37]​ These behaviours are driven by competition and in a way they open a further debate as to what extent competition and consumer protection in the financial marketplace are compatible. This exceeds the purpose of this study but it shows how competition, alongside ‘predatory’ yet not ‘fraudulent’ business models taking advantage of consumers being in debt,​[38]​ may provide market failures of ‘irresponsible’ behaviour to be corrected.
By the same token, behavioural economics have demonstrated that borrowers are not rational maxi-misers of their resources and they may well take wrong borrowing decisions even if they are provided with adequate information.​[39]​
The above are market failures that may justify the intervention of public measures of responsible credit. The restoration of contractual balance between the parties of a credit agreement, redistributive justice, and paternalism may be additional rationales. Others have identified a further justification in a public broader function to prevent citizens from falling below a minimum welfare level within a healthy free market economy, thus protecting social welfare.​[40]​ 




4.	The ensuing legal response: the usual information paradigm and creditworthiness assessment

4.1.	Responsible lending and private law

From a legal perspective, responsible lending and borrowing are novel but controversial notions that potentially turn upside down traditional contract law principles which have already been eroded by consumer law.
In many respects, contracts regulated by private law are the life-force of the market economy under the principles of freedom of contract and party autonomy. Nonetheless, it is well known how markets require public regulation to the extent that private law alone is incapable of achieving a free and fair market. Notoriously, this is the case of the bulk of consumer law where the legislator intervenes to correct recognised market failures of power imbalance, unfair practices, or redistribute rights and resources.​[41]​
Credit agreements are undeniably the expression of a private law relationship and no right to credit exists. In many instances, consumer law has already affected the legal principle of caveat emptor – let the buyer beware – typical of traditional contract law theory of the Member States. But while responsible borrowing and certain aspects of responsible lending with their disclosure duties may be seen as a form of pre-contractual responsibility or an expression of good faith in the pre-contractual phase of civil law systems, other elements of responsible lending seem to depart even further from a traditional consumer law perspective. In holding lenders responsible for delivering products that best suit the needs of the individual consumer and accountable during all phases of the contractual relationship, some have seen the addition of an atypical fiduciary element to the commercial contract that is normally reserved to agency law or fiduciary relationships.​[42]​ From another angle, it may also be argued that in principle it intrudes even further in the individual responsibility of one party of the contract introducing new duties of looking after, or taking responsibility for, the other party - thus shifting paternalism from the State to the former contracting party and/or raising questions of commercial entities becoming to a degree social actors beyond their function.
In any event, regardless of philosophical questions and debates over how much paternalism society is ready to accept or the ‘social’ function of commercial entities, the significance of responsible lending and borrowing remains contingent on its method of legal implementation.​[43]​
This is where the EU approaches towards over-indebtedness in general, and responsible lending and borrowing in particular, become puzzling.

4.2.	The Consumer Credit Directive

As already outlined, so far the EU has been concerned primarily with the creation of an integrated common credit market with a focus on competition, innovation and consumer choice. The Consumer Credit Directive (CCD)​[44]​ provides a clear example of a full harmonising measure attempting to extend the internal market for financial services to the specific field of consumer credit. As already extensively recognised by many commentators, it does not mention over-indebtedness​[45]​ nor does it include any specific provision on responsible lending.​[46]​ This is not only remarkable because of the frustration of the previous recognition of over-indebtedness as a European problem and of the ensuing policy impetus on responsible lending, but also for the emphasis given to such a policy in the earlier drafts of the CCD that was not retained in the final version.
Rott offers a detailed account of the legislative history of the CCD showing how the Commission originally aimed at avoiding the consumer’s over-indebtedness by evading unreasonable credit contracts, introducing duties of lenders to assess and advise consumers on the risks of default and holding them responsible during all phases of the contractual relationship.​[47]​ Instead, the final version of the CCD remains anchored on the usual paradigm of transparency and information requirements by both lenders and borrowers, adding a focus on an undetermined requirement of creditworthiness assessment.​[48]​
In the view of the EU legislator of the CCD, thus, the significance of responsible lending is limited to duties to explain and disclose, and an obligation to assess the creditworthiness of consumers. In particular, Article 8 of the CCD states that creditors have to make such an assessment on the basis of sufficient information obtained from the consumer and, where it is necessary, on the basis of a consultation of the relevant database.​[49]​ The directive further allows Member States whose legislation requires creditors to consult databases to maintain this obligation, often a requirement that may be imposed by central banks for purposes of financial stability. At the same time, for competition purposes, in the following Article 9 the CCD is concerned that access to databases used in another Member State, if any, is ensured on a non-discriminatory basis for creditors from other Member States.
Significantly, the CCD does not provide directly for legal obligations to deny credit in case of breach of lenders’ duties, particularly as regards the creditworthiness assessment, but it delegates sanctions to Member States.​[50]​
In general, the CCD has been reasonably criticized not only for not imbuing responsible lending in its provisions but especially for insisting on relying on the ability of informed, confident and rational consumers as drivers of economic efficiency​[51]​ but not caring about the socially and financially vulnerable consumers​[52]​ such as those who become over-indebted.

4.3.	The Mortgage Credit Directive

The adoption of the Mortgage Credit Directive (MCD),​[53]​ which has been designed against the backdrop of the financial crisis and as another effort to create a transparent, efficient and competitive internal market for mortgage credit​[54]​, may be considered a step in the direction of a closer legal transposition of responsible lending. Whether this is sufficient to address over-indebtedness, though, is another matter which will be discussed further below.
To some degree, the MCD insists and reproduces the information and transparency model of the CCD in the advertising, marketing, product specifications, pre-contractual and contractual information (including intermediaries and representatives), etc.​[55]​ 
The novelty is the introduction of a number of norms that in principle may better correspond to the concept of responsible credit explicated in the policies. These include the following provisions: 
-	the financial education of consumers in relation to responsible borrowing and debt management, including guidance to consumers in the credit granting process;​[56]​
-	 conduct of business obligations and product suitability more tailored on individual circumstances, including methods of incentives or remuneration for staff or intermediaries;​[57]​ 
-	methods for calculating interest rates transparently.​[58]​

The creditworthiness assessment of consumers features sturdily in the MCD as the most reliable tool capable of fostering responsible lending. The EU legislator believes that imposing such a duty will enable lenders to determine the ability of consumers to meet their obligations under the credit agreement, and thus a tool to detect or prevent over-indebted consumers. After the lesson learned from the financial crisis, such an assessment “shall not rely predominantly on the value of the residential immovable property exceeding the amount of the credit or the assumption that the residential immovable property will increase in value”.​[59]​ On the contrary, it should be based on information contained in databases alongside income, expenditures, savings, assets, and other circumstances about the consumer.​[60]​ 
What appears extraordinary is that mainstream lenders already availed themselves of credit databases well before the financial crisis and the passing of the MCD, and they have always demanded relevant information to the applicants. But, arguably, the creation of the internal market and competition suggested that access to such information should be mandated on a non-discriminatory basis. This is not the right place to engage in discussions as to the appropriateness, proportionality or institutional guarantees of practices of creditworthiness assessment in the Member States,​[61]​ but it deserves a mention the undesirable effect of this provision in that - in the name of an asserted responsible lending - it justifies and empowers the financial industry with the use of invasive data sharing assessment tools which not only provide uncertain results in the fight against over-indebtedness (see further below) but that may also interfere with established fundamental rights of individuals such as data protection.
Article 18(5) of the MCD introduces a nominal ‘duty to deny credit’ but the nature of this provision is far from clear. This may not be the right place to engage in in-depth analysis of such a duty, but questions could be anticipated if this is a public or a private obligation, as well as resulting sanctions. All what the MCD does is a reference to sanctions to be set-up by the Member States individually. What nevertheless appears clear is that the provision hardly tackles the problem of over-indebtedness since its violation cannot lead to a debt cancellation without immediate repayment of the lent capital. Also, it can be questioned whether a positive assessment of the creditworthiness of the debtor implies a contrariis a ‘right to credit’ which would certainly be debatable. In short, the provision may raise a number of problematic legal issues leaving the doubt of the extent to which such a measure could have any effect on the financial difficulties of consumers. Separate legal analyses will have to follow.
What probably represents the most innovative institution of the MCD is the enactment of high-level principles on arrears and foreclosures. This is the first attempt to introduce a sort of curative, as opposed to preventive, measures under EU law. In its preamble, the MCD acknowledges that foreclosure can have significant consequences on consumers and it asserts that it is appropriate to encourage creditors to deal proactively with emerging credit risk at an early stage. It considers important to have in place the necessary measures to ensure that lenders exercise reasonable forbearance and make reasonable attempts to resolve the situation through other means before foreclosure proceedings are initiated.​[62]​ Article 28 of the MCD sets out provisions on arrears and foreclosure, and specifically requires that Member States adopt measures to encourage creditors to exercise reasonable forbearance1 before foreclosure proceedings are initiated. 
The nature of this provision is questionable and it will hardly harmonise the law of the Member States. But, as said, it is a principle aimed at introducing debt solutions that penetrates into EU law and that may pave the way for additional ‘curative’ legal measures whose absence arguably represent the ‘elephant in the room’ in the field of over-indebtedness.
Indeed, to ensure that these high-level provisions will be implemented and supervised consistently across the Member States and in support of the transposition in the legal systems of the Member States the European Banking Authority (EBA) - the new independent EU Authority in charge of the prudential regulation and supervision across the European banking sector​[63]​ - has now issued a consultation on draft guidelines that aim at providing in greater detail how lenders should give effect to the provisions of Article 28 of the MCD.​[64]​
These guidelines will request on lenders the establishment of policies and procedures to detect and handle consumers in financial difficulty, actively engage with the consumer and provide an undefined form of support alongside basic information as to the status of payments, consequences of failure to repay, and the existence of public schemes or support. As it concerns the resolution process, the guidelines contain a limited indication of the creditor having to take into account the individual circumstances of the consumer and his interests (including the ability to repay) when deciding on which steps or forbearance measures to take. The listed concessions to the consumer include a total or partial refinancing of a credit agreement and/or a modification of the previous terms and conditions of a credit agreement (such as extension of the term of the mortgage; change of the type of the mortgage; deferral of payment of all or part of the instalment repayment for a period; change of the interest rate; or offer of a payment holiday).​[65]​




5.	Resetting the EU agenda with the integration of a reformed system of personal insolvency with responsible lending and consumer protection –can it be the way forward?

5.1.	A critique of the current framework

Arguably, a criticism that may be moved to the MCD is that responsible lending - as translated into EU law - is inadequate to address over-indebtedness for the undetermined and unenforceable nature of its corresponding provisions and the inherent difficulty of their enforcement.
The provisions on financial education, product suitability, conduct of business, remuneration structures, and arrears and foreclosure (alongside their guidelines) take the form of open-texture principles but it is difficult to imagine their enforcement and ensuing sanctions once transposed into national laws. This work is concerned with over-indebtedness and not with the effective harmonisation of such provisions and the removal of obstacles for the establishment of a single market, but at some point questions will have to be raised as to the market effects of having different implementing measures and practices in the Member States or the use of soft law to give effect to such principled norms.
In any event, however, enforcement will remain a key aspect of an already weak and insufficient focus on responsible lending to combat over-indebtedness.
Its weakness mainly lays in the perseverance of the creditworthiness assessment as a sort of panacea for the prevention and detection of the problem. Experience shows that in the EU it was a method already in use and the toxic practices of sub-prime mortgage lending were an US phenomenon almost unknown in the Member States.​[67]​ If anything, excluded consumers from mainstream lending have resorted to other more dangerous forms of legal or illegal credit, and there should be more focus on the practices of creditworthiness assessment in place to properly address the policy goals set by the law. If financial institutions are to lend responsibly beyond their interest, this is to address the risk of consumers becoming over-indebted. But it has been demonstrated that credit provision is not a main cause of over-indebtedness. This is not to suggest a complete uselessness of creditworthiness assessment. When suitably designed, it may help to detect existing or early signs of debt problems or unaffordability which is something that mainstream lenders have always cared about. But the reality is that over-indebtedness continues to increase. Therefore, after more than a decade of uses by the credit industry of databases as the principal method coupled with the other practices, the reasons why creditworthiness assessment has failed remain mysterious unless it is recognised that creditworthiness alone is inadequate. 
Moreover, a proper responsible lending should include measures of interest-rate caps or limitation of penalties, as well as measures to guarantee access to basic or affordable credit.​[68]​ These issues raise further complex political and legal problems in the Member States and exceed the purpose of this analysis. The point is that giving a proper meaning to responsible lending would have an outreach much broader than what EU law provides.
This is why the renovated primary focus on creditworthiness assessment of the MCD induces to make the same considerations that Weatherill has advanced in the context of the CCD, that is that behind its thin provisions lies the real debate about the proper reach of EU intervention in this domain, and the continuing opposing thrust of EU policies in opening-up credit markets.​[69]​ If the CCD does nothing to tackle over-indebtedness, the MCD does probably too little.
For sure, unfair and predatory practices need to be tackled. Yet again, it is doubtful that information disclosure, transparency, and creditworthiness assessment are the solutions. Instead, in the wake of the financial crisis the case law of the CJEU has demonstrated a surge in litigation grounded in the dated unfair contract terms EU legislation​[70]​ applied to credit agreements – colourfully but meaningfully depicted as “Sleeping Beauty awaken by the kiss of the ECJ”.​[71]​ 
The Spanish mortgage saga takes stock of the situation and the way EU unfair contract terms legislation impact on national procedural law in the protection of consumers in financial difficulty. In Aziz​[72]​ and Sánchez Morcillo​[73]​ national law was deemed unfair for not granting consumers adequate procedural defences in mortgage contracts, as a result of which it was amended. Likewise, the recent Advocate-General’s opinion in the cases Unicaja Banco and Caixabank​[74]​ confirms the trend of Member States having to ensure that consumers are not bound by unfair clauses in credit agreements.

5.2.	The ‘Elephant in the Room’: EU Personal Insolvency Law

It is an established truism that no policy designed to prevent over-indebtedness can on its own address the problem. Preventive measures alone, however designed but without ex-post debt solutions, cannot be conclusive.​[75]​ In analogical terms, it would be like having in place measures to prevent someone to get injured but without having the medicines if this occurs – with the aggravation of allowing others to injure the patient even further, possibly finishing him/her (in the analogy, the various interests/penalties and unregulated debt collection procedures).
A problem is that over-indebtedness has been taken in a static dimension. At EU level, all the legal constructions and measurements make reference to the time when consumers apply for credit. This is clear from the policies and laws which insist on the usual paradigm of information requirements, transparency and the assessment of creditworthiness at the time of the making of the loan. Such measures may capture limited circumstances of existing or likely debt problems if further credit is taken, but they fail to address the real and most frequent causes of consumer over-indebtedness, such as life-time events, poor market conditions, and all the other elements identified by the latest studies on the problem – all having in common that the repayment difficulties emerge at a later stage that responsible lending cannot possibly foresee.
By nature, EU responsible lending policies do not offer debt solutions. Therefore, it appears self-evident how the current legal responses are inconsistent and intrinsically unsuitable to deal with a complex multi-dimensional problem such as household over-indebtedness. Arguably, a more dynamic approach tackling the real causes and the various stages of financial difficulty is needed. As anticipated earlier, while the former solutions may prove extremely complex and are subject to radical political choices by the Member States, the latter solutions are not new to academic studies and reports. A study managed by the Financial Services User Group (FSUG)​[76]​ on means to protect European consumers in financial difficulty presented a variety of suitable debt solutions aiming at allowing them a fresh start by re-organising, reducing or cancelling the debt value.​[77]​
Actually, as over-indebtedness increases in the aftermath of the crisis, many Member States are moving towards new or renovated national regimes for the protection of consumers in financial distress and the treatment of the insolvency of natural persons.​[78]​ However, these are individual but uncoordinated legal initiatives in the Member States which expose the complete absence of common, harmonized or appropriately resourced strategies at EU level.
Yet, the EU would arguably have competence to enact hard law in the area of consumer insolvency. Some have casted doubts​[79]​ and there may be issues of subsidiarity and proportionality. But there could be grounds for EU action under the competence attributed to it by Article 2(2) TFEU, falling within the areas detailed in Article 4 TFEU of (a) internal market, (b) (c) social and economic policy and cohesion, and (f) consumer protection​[80]​ - but traditionally the EU has not been too receptive in using social grounds for approximation of market legislation. However, the submission of the European Economic and Social Council for a uniform or harmonised procedure based on Article 38 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (Consumer Protection), as well as Articles 114 TFEU (Establishment and Functioning of the Internal Market) and 81 TFEU (Judicial Cooperation in Civil Matters), appear convincing.​[81]​ Market grounds are most probably a more persuasive button for the EU legislator. For example, in cognate areas such as the right to a basic bank account the EU - faced by initial opposition on grounds of subsidiarity - has intervened relying on barriers to the completion of the single market that may be created by the fragmentation of existing national regulatory frameworks.​[82]​ The Radziejewski case suggests that national insolvency procedures for natural persons may be restrictive of the fundamental free movement rights of the EU.​[83]​ Reasons of economic efficiency and financial stability could also be explored further.
At present, in the area of insolvency law, Council Regulation (EC) 1346/2000​[84]​ and its proposed reform​[85]​ - which extend to proceedings providing for a debt discharge of consumers and self-employed persons - do not attempt to enforce a common system at EU level, but instead to ensure that insolvency proceedings opened in one Member State are recognized in all other Member States. Any European consumer who meets the qualification criteria of a country which does permit consumer bankruptcy has the ability and right to access this, effectively making their domestic legislative position irrelevant. The regulation outlines that the domestic law of the country where the case is opened is applicable as long as the individual has established a ‘centre of main interest’ (COMI) in the relevant jurisdiction. Moreover, the Regulation’s rules have given raise to forum shopping also by natural persons through abusive COMI-relocation. The proposed reform is designed to improve the co-ordination of insolvency proceedings within the EU; ensure the equitable treatment of creditors and to minimise ‘forum shopping’, i.e. the movement of assets from one country to another so as to take advantage of a more favourable legal position.
In any event, COMI provisions and the proposed reform could be capable of affecting a minority of skilled or well-informed consumers/small traders, but they can hardly be applicable to the majority of people in financial distress, i.e. the vulnerable consumers.
Arguably, a reformed common system for the treatment of the insolvency of natural persons at EU level, which departs radically from the current approach of mutual recognition, should step-in to provide a more complete response to address the over-indebtedness of European consumers, not as a form of social assistance but rather as a social insurance protecting individuals and society from ruin and degradation, as well as counterproductive and destructive debt management and enforcement practices that are also detrimental for creditors. Ultimately, the intended stance questions the use of mutual recognition in the context of over-indebtedness and the insolvency of natural persons. Mutual recognition and private international law in the EU are used when it is difficult for Member States to reach agreement on the substantive laws.​[86]​ However, the integration of retail financial markets, consumer protection, responsible lending, and social and economic cohesion are derived from the EU Treaties to justify the EU competence for a common, harmonised or resourced strategy at Union level.
A large amount of scholarship has already been devoted to the complexities of personal insolvency regulation in the Member States and the wide diversity of existing national systems and rules (e.g. on civil and procedural matters or institutional structures), differences in market conditions, credit cultures and sensitiveness towards the issue for consumer protection.​[87]​ As seen above, now additional research is available on its causes and dynamics. This new information fits well with other recent scholarship showing how empirical evidence provides little support for arguments grounded on the national legal traditions, local institutional structures or cultural attitudes of consumer insolvency laws. Therefore, these should not represent further obstacles for an EU reformed system.​[88]​ Deregulation and integration of financial markets were brought in by the EU regardless of pre-existing national legal traditions, institutions and cultures. By the same token, it wouldn’t be a revolutionary idea if the EU were to step in with measures to fix the very same market with the treatment of its side effects. An opening may be the European Commission Recommendation ‘on a new approach to business failure and insolvency’, which invites Member States to explore the possibility of applying its recommendations on restructuring and a fresh start also to consumers.​[89]​ Probably some further empirical research is necessary to capture the stakeholders’ perceived need of a common EU framework, as well as the usual impact assessment so dear to the EU legislator.
In the end the whole suggestion is that if the EU has to take the treatment of over-indebtedness seriously, at least as an integral element of the internal credit market, it should reset as a priority its current policy and legal agenda with re-conceptualised and integrated responsible lending and personal insolvency regimes, where irresponsible lending and borrowing behaviours are punished but objective difficulties, good faith and innocent delinquency find protection.






This work examined the over-indebtedness of European consumers and the suitability of the current measures taken by the EU.
The latest findings on the nature and causes of the problem question the policies and law adopted so far. Over-indebtedness is a complex multi-dimensional problem which results in the excessive level or inability to meet financial commitments, even the basic ones. The majority of its causes are not rooted in the private law relationship between lenders and consumers at the time of contracting but in life-time events or macro-economic conditions beyond their control. The pecuniary commitment with financial institutions is certainly affected, and if anything it contributes to make the situation worse once interests, penalties and fees become due, and debt collection procedures begin.
In principle, preventive measures are desirable but EU responsible lending and borrowing, as designed, are not suited to deal with the complex multi-dimensional nature of the problem. The information paradigm which imbues the law and the focus on the creditworthiness assessment have been criticised for being ineffective, at least if taken in isolation and without complementary elements of a credit that is truly comprehensively responsible, including for e.g. interest rate caps and access to basic or affordable credit.
A more dynamic approach tackling all the causes and the various stages of financial difficulty would be needed. But EU law cannot deal with the difficult national macro-economic policies where most of the causes are embedded. These include unemployment, salary levels and labour markets, provision of social care and assistance etc. These are sensitive political matters to be confronted by the Member States.
Nevertheless, a desirable legal regime should cover comprehensively all the stages of the financial difficulty of consumers. These include both preventive and curative measures. Also, it should recognise that the financial distress of natural persons is intertwined with market as well social issues.
Therefore, this work argues that EU responsible lending and borrowing as designed under EU law are inadequate. In any event, preventive measures alone are insufficient to deal with such a complex multi-dimensional problem. Instead, an integrated but reformed EU personal insolvency regime would be necessary.
To the extent that preventive measures are important and they are an EU matter – as exemplified by the MCD – equally so would be for over-indebtedness solutions.
To this end, personal insolvency legislation should also be revisited. Unless the current reference law is reformed at EU level, it will be of little or no use to natural persons in financial difficulty, i.e. the vulnerable consumers.
This study did not mean to analyse the substantive aspects of the current bankruptcy law – which at any rate has not been conceived for consumer insolvency. Nor does it propose one or another specific model or design of insolvency law for consumers. Instead, it submits that full harmonisation through hard-law would be the way forward in integrating personal insolvency with responsible credit and consumer protection. This should not be limited to mortgage loans but comprehensive of the entire debt position of the consumer citizen and the circumstances that have led to over-indebtedness. 
Clearly, it is recognised that there will be many devils in the details of such a proposition. As indicated earlier, however, before that the first major difficulty to overcome looks political more than legal or cultural. But the claim remains that the EU has competence in the area of consumer insolvency and it should take it. Then, further work is needed to explore how to design it and the extent to which it could be separated from corporate bankruptcy and insolvency law, and the plethora of specific issues that surrounds the latter.
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